

Designing a Model for an Artificial Intelligence Crime Compensation Fund Based on Jurisprudential Principles

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ABSTRACT

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence technology has created new challenges in the field of civil and criminal liability. One of the most important challenges is how to compensate for damages caused by crimes committed by intelligent systems. This research aims to design a model for an AI crime compensation fund based on jurisprudential standards. The research method is qualitative, employing content analysis of jurisprudential and legal texts. The findings indicate that, by invoking jurisprudential rules such as "la darar," "tasbib," and "ghurur," the Sharia foundations of the proposed fund can be established. The proposed model comprises three levels of participants (manufacturers, users, and intelligent systems), financial resources (fines, insurance, and taxation), and a compensation mechanism (a capped system). The findings indicate that the fund is jurisprudentially feasible and that enacting relevant legislation in this field is necessary.

Keywords :

Artificial Intelligence, Compensation, Compensation Fund, Jurisprudential Rules, Civil Liability.

1.Introduction

The rapid advancement of artificial intelligence (AI) technology has confronted traditional legal and jurisprudential systems with fundamental challenges. Today's intelligent systems are capable of making autonomous decisions and taking actions that, when they result in harm or a criminal offense, complicate the question of who bears responsibility. Any harmful act or omission committed by a robot gives rise to liability, and depending on the circumstances, a human agent is held liable and required to compensate for the damage on the basis of the theory of “respect” (ihtiram), since the robot itself lacks legal or natural personality and cannot bear the burden of compensation (Nazarpour et al., 2021). Choosing a clear and coherent liability mechanism for artificial intelligence is socially and economically significant. National legal systems have adopted differing approaches to accommodate the challenges posed by AI (Zakerinia, 2023, p. 135). European Union law does not recognize criminal liability for artificial intelligence, holding that criminal liability for AI would require conferring legal personality upon it. Iranian criminal law likewise does not define criminal liability for artificial intelligence. The impossibility of achieving the aims of punishment, and the impracticability of imposing corporal, custodial, or financial penalties on AI, are the most important challenges to recognizing criminal liability for artificial intelligence (Kaveh & Barani, 2024, p. 51).

While Western legal systems have experimented with a variety of models — including direct AI liability, strict liability, and vicarious liability — the Islamic jurisprudential system must, relying on rules such as “tasbib” (causation), “iqdam” (assumption of risk), and “la darar” (no harm), find a response to this problem consistent with Sharia standards.

Although recognizing independent legal personality for artificial intelligence currently lacks sufficient theoretical and practical support, Imamiyya jurisprudence possesses the capacity necessary for dynamic development and interpretation so as to attribute liability to the human persons involved in the design, production, and deployment of this technology. Moreover, exclusive reliance on the fault-based model in Iranian civil law does not adequately address every instance of AI-related liability, and the supplementary application of risk-based and strict-liability theories could better secure the rights of injured parties (Salemi, 2025).

The central problem addressed by this research is the following: assuming that it is impossible, or exceedingly difficult, to attribute the criminal conduct of an artificial intelligence system to a specific human agent, how can the jurisprudential rules of “la darar” and “the blood of a Muslim shall not go to waste” be honored so that the harm suffered by the victim is not left uncompensated? The hypothesis is that, drawing on analogous institutions in Islamic jurisprudence (such as the 'aqilah and bayt al-mal) and on contemporary legal experience (no-fault compensation funds), a model for a jurisprudentially grounded compensation fund can be designed.

The significance of this research lies in filling an existing research gap while offering a practical solution for legislators in Islamic countries confronting crimes arising from emerging technologies. Accordingly, the objectives of this research are: (1) to establish the jurisprudential foundations for the permissibility of creating an AI crime compensation fund; (2) to design an operational model for such a fund; and (3) to assess the model's compatibility with the principles of Imamiyya jurisprudence.

2. Literature Review

In Western law, the discussion of compensation funds has a relatively long history. Motor-vehicle accident compensation funds in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland, and Norway) are among the most successful examples of schemes that provide prompt compensation for damages without requiring proof of fault (Bärlund, 2019, p. 45). The European Union has likewise addressed the creation of mechanisms to facilitate claims and compensation in its draft Artificial Intelligence Liability Directive (2022) (European Commission, 2022).

In Islamic jurisprudence, there is no direct precedent for discussing an AI crime compensation fund as such, but analogous foundations and institutions can be identified. The institution of the 'aqilah in Islamic criminal jurisprudence is one whereby the relatives of a person who has committed unintentional homicide are obligated to pay the blood money (diyah). Although this institution has faced criticism within Imamiyya jurisprudence, the underlying principle of shared liability for compensation in the absence of a direct agent can be inferred from it. Likewise, bayt al-mal, as the public treasury in Islamic governance, has historically borne responsibility for compensating damages arising from public incidents and crimes with no identifiable perpetrator (Mousavi Bojnourdi, 2019, p. 212).

In the contemporary jurisprudential literature, some studies have pointed to the necessity of establishing specialized funds. Hashemi Shahroudi (2019 CE), discussing the civil liability of the state, holds that bayt al-mal bears liability in cases where direct harm did not arise from a private individual's act. Similarly, Makarem Shirazi (2016), in fatwas concerning damages caused by robots, has accepted the principle of liability on the basis of the rule of “la darar” and has recommended recourse to a “general insurance fund.”

However, the principal research gap is that no detailed, operational model for such a fund within the framework of Imamiyya jurisprudence has yet been designed. Existing studies have either confined themselves to the general jurisprudential permissibility of such a fund (e.g., Mohaghegh Damad, 2019) or have merely critiqued Western models (Rahmani, 2022). This research therefore seeks to fill precisely this gap.

3. Methodology

This research is qualitative in nature and employs an analytical-descriptive method, suitable for research aimed at explicating and analyzing legal and jurisprudential texts and concepts (Khoshbakht et al., 2020, p. 78). The study design comprises three layers: analysis of jurisprudential texts to derive applicable rules; a comparative examination of analogous institutions in jurisprudence (the 'aqilah, bayt al-mal, ghurur); and a critical synthesis of these findings to produce the proposed model.

Sources and data-collection method: Data were gathered from three categories of sources: (1) Imamiyya jurisprudential sources, including classical works (such as Sheikh Ansari's *al-Makasib* and Sayyid Yazdi's *al-'Urwat al-Wuthqa*) and contemporary works (Imam Khomeini's *Tahrir al-Wasilah*, Shahid Sadr's *Fiqh al-Qada*); (2) Persian- and Arabic-language peer-reviewed articles from the past ten years (2015–2025) using the keywords “AI liability,” “compensation,” and “jurisprudential rules”; and (3) foreign sources, including institutional reports (Europol, 2025; ENISA, 2024) and legal books and articles in English and German.

Method of analysis: The principal analytical technique is directed content analysis employing “interpretive *ijtihad*.” That is, jurisprudential texts were interpreted with reference to their underlying principles (*usul*) and literal import (*mantuq*), and their applicability to the subject of artificial intelligence was then assessed.

The validity of the findings was ensured through the “triangulation” of sources (combining jurisprudential, legal, and empirical-report sources) and by examining differing juristic opinions on each issue.

4. Findings and Discussion

4.1. Jurisprudential Foundations for the Permissibility of Establishing the Fund

Analysis of the jurisprudential texts shows that four principal rules can serve as the Sharia basis for an AI crime compensation fund. These rules, which have consistently received the attention of Shi'a jurists throughout the history of Islamic jurisprudence, possess the capacity for interpretation and extension to newly arising subjects, including artificial intelligence technology.

The First Rule: La Darar

This rule, derived from the well-known Prophetic tradition “there shall be no harm and no reciprocal harm in Islam,” is one of the settled and foundational rules of jurisprudence. The tradition — issued in response to a man named Samurah ibn Jundab, who had planted his palm tree on the property of a man of the Ansar — has become a basis for negating any harm or reciprocal harm within the Islamic legal system. Under this rule, no one has the right to harm another, and where harm occurs, it must be compensated (Ansari, 1994, p. 43).

Great Shi'a jurists have, throughout history, extended this rule and presented it as a principle governing all chapters of jurisprudence. Sheikh Morteza Ansari, in his valuable work *al-Rasa'il*, addressed the various dimensions of this rule in detail and classified it among the rules on which reason and Sharia concur. Mohaqqeq Na'ini, in his lecture notes, likewise explained the rule of *la darar* as a governmental and secondary ruling capable of qualifying or restricting primary rulings under particular circumstances.

With respect to AI-caused damages, where a human agent cannot be identified, or where proving fault would impose excessive hardship on the victim, the rule of *la darar* requires that the Islamic community (*bayt al-mal*) or a specific institution (the fund) be obligated to compensate the loss. This argument rests on the premise that leaving the victim uncompensated is itself an instance of harm, which the Sacred Lawgiver has negated. In other words, the “negation of harm” carries an affirmative implication: not only must new harm not be caused, but existing harm must also be remedied. This reading of the rule of *la darar* can also be found in the works of jurists such as Imam Khomeini and Ayatollah Khoei.

The Second Rule: Tasbib (Causation)

The rule that “whoever causes the cessation of a life or an injury is liable” (Hor Ameli, 1988, vol. 19, p. 176) indicates that a person who brings about the cause of death or injury is liable. In jurisprudence, a fundamental distinction exists between “*mubasharah*” (direct commission) and “*tasbib*” (creating the ground or cause for an act to occur); although in many cases the ruling for both is liability, except where a specific ground for non-liability exists.

In jurisprudential analysis, *tasbib* is of two kinds: “strong” causation, which is customarily treated as equivalent to direct commission, and “weak” causation, which requires that certain specific conditions be established before liability arises. What matters with respect to artificial intelligence is that programmers, manufacturers, and users who, through the design, production, or deployment of AI, create the grounds for

a crime to occur — even indirectly — qualify as a “cause” (*musabbib*) and may accordingly be identified both as contributors to the fund and as parties ultimately liable where fault is established.

It is worth noting that in contemporary jurisprudence, the discussion of causation in emerging technologies has expanded considerably. Some recent studies show that, with respect to autonomous systems, all consequences cannot simply be attributed to a human being; rather, a distinction must be drawn among different levels of causation. These distinctions bear directly on the design of the compensation-fund model, since they determine at what level, and to what extent, each human actor is responsible for contributing to the fund.

The Third Rule: Ghurur (Deceptive Inducement)

The rule of “*al-ghurur*,” or “whoever deceives another is liable” (Najafi, 1967, vol. 37, p. 98), holds that anyone who, through deception and the creation of false confidence, causes harm to another is liable. In the jurisprudential sources, *ghurur* is defined as instilling in another a sense of assurance and trust such that it induces that person to act, or to refrain from acting. This rule is clearly recognized both in the traditions and in the conduct of rational persons (*sirat al-'uqala'*).

This rule has particularly wide application to artificial intelligence marketed by commercial companies with claims of “safety” and “reliability.” Such companies typically use extensive marketing and selectively presented statistics to instill false confidence in users and the public that their intelligent systems are free of any defect or risk. This assurance — whether explicit in contracts or implicit in advertising — is a clear instance of *ghurur* and provides a basis for holding companies liable for resulting damages.

In contemporary jurisprudence, the discussion of *ghurur* has expanded within the fields of civil liability and electronic commerce and lends itself to application to emerging technologies. Some scholars maintain that the rule of *ghurur* can serve as a jurisprudential basis for requiring manufacturers to compensate for damages caused by technical defects in their products, even where fault cannot be proven.

The Fourth Rule: *al-Ghurum bil Ghunm* (Liability Accompanies Benefit).

The rule of “*al-kharaj bi'l-daman*,” or “*al-ghurm bil ghum*” (Makarem Shirazi, 2003, vol. 1, p. 244), expresses the necessary correlation between profit and loss. This rule is derived from the well-known Prophetic tradition “*al-kharaj bi'l-daman*,” which, in the context of sale and other transactions, indicates that whoever derives the benefit of property must also bear its potential losses. Rational persons likewise follow the practice that benefiting from an activity or asset entails accepting the risks associated with it.

In the age of information technology, this rule has found particular application. Those who profit from AI technology — including major technology companies, industrial and commercial users, and even the state, through increased productivity and tax revenue — should also participate in compensating for the damages it causes. This rule provides a strong justification for levying a contribution from beneficiaries and channeling financial resources into the fund.

It is important to note that the rule of *al-ghurm bil ghum* not only provides the jurisprudential basis for the participation of beneficiaries in the fund but also determines the extent of that participation. The ratio between benefit and loss under this rule is a customary and reasonable one, meaning that each party is liable to contribute to compensating for damages in proportion to the benefit it derives from AI technology. This approach is also consistent with the principles of distributive justice within the Islamic legal system.

Taken together, these four rules form a coherent jurisprudential system that, both in terms of theoretical foundations and practical feasibility, possesses the capacity necessary to establish an AI crime compensation fund.

4.2. Proposed Model of the Fund

On the basis of the jurisprudential foundations set out above, the model for the AI crime compensation fund can be depicted at three levels. This model has been designed to satisfy Sharia standards while also possessing practical operability.

Level One: Organs and Participants. The fund should be administered under the supervision of a jurisprudential council and the oversight of the judiciary, or a body designated by the Supreme Leader (vali-ye faqih). Establishing a jurisprudential council is necessary so that, in cases of doubt regarding rulings or **a possible conflict among jurisprudential rules, a competent authority exists to render a decision.** **Contributors to the fund's resources fall into three groups:**

(1) AI developers and programmers (on the basis of the rules of tasbib and ghurur), who are obligated to pay a percentage of their annual revenue into the fund. The rule of tasbib requires that they deposit a portion of the profit derived from commercializing and selling intelligent products into the fund as a form of “guarantee” and “provision against future liability.” The rule of ghurur likewise obligates companies that have, through advertising, created false confidence among users to participate more substantially in the fund.

(2) Professional users of artificial intelligence (companies, factories, financial and service institutions) that benefit from AI on the basis of the rule of “al-ghurm bil ghunm” and the rule of “iqdam” (assumption of risk). This group is likewise obligated to pay a specified share of the revenue derived from the use of intelligent technologies into the fund.

(3) The state, from bayt al-mal, as the ultimate party responsible for compensating public damages in cases where none of the foregoing human actors can be identified, or where their resources are insufficient to fully compensate the harm. This component is justified on the basis of the rule of la darar and the conduct of rational persons in Islamic societies.

Level Two: Financial Resources. The fund's financial resources are drawn from three sources:

(1) Fines and sureties arising from proven fault in AI-related offenses, such as the fines that courts impose on manufacturing companies or negligent users where culpability is established. These sums are deposited directly into the fund. On this basis, the judicial system may allocate part of a judgment amount to the fund rather than paying it directly to the victim, particularly where the victim has already received compensation from the fund.

(2) A separate insurance premium levied on every commercial and functional unit of artificial intelligence, similar to value-added tax but designated as a “liability fee” or “mandatory smart-technology insurance.” The rate of this premium is determined according to risk level, meaning that intelligent systems with a higher degree of autonomy, or higher-risk applications, will bear a higher rate. This source is justified on the basis of the rule of ghurur (since AI developers, by marketing their products, create an implicit guarantee of safety) and the rule of la darar (since every AI unit in society is a potential source of harm).

(3) A government subsidy from the public budget (bayt al-mal) in the event of a shortfall in the fund. The Islamic state, as the party responsible for implementing jurisprudential rules and preserving public order, is obligated to make up any shortfall where the fund's resources prove insufficient to compensate damages. This component rests on the rule of la darar and also on the rule negating hardship and constraint ('usr wa haraj).

Level Three: Compensation Mechanism. The compensation mechanism in the proposed model has three essential features:

1. No-fault compensation: This is the fund's most important and distinctive feature. Contrary to the primary jurisprudential rule, which conditions compensation on proof of fault or the establishment of definite causation, this fund — relying on “secondary rulings” and the rule of “maslaha” (public interest, i.e., preserving social order and preventing the paralysis of judicial recourse and the indefinite non-compensation of victims of new technologies) — provides compensation without the need to prove fault, based solely on establishing that harm resulted from the operation of an intelligent system.

This approach has precedent in a number of instances within the Iranian jurisprudential and legal system. One well-known example is the payment of blood money (diyah) for pure accidental homicide under the Iranian judicial system, whereby, where a killing occurs through pure accident (with no fault whatsoever on the part of the agent), the diyah is paid from bayt al-mal (Article 485 of the Islamic Penal Code of 2013). Likewise, no-fault compensation is recognized in the laws governing damages arising from mandatory vaccination or from traffic accidents caused by natural factors.

2. A maximum ceiling: Drawing inspiration from the diyah system in jurisprudence, which sets a fixed, defined, and capped amount (currently 150 full Bahar Azadi gold coins for a life), damages to persons and property under this fund are likewise subject to a defined ceiling. For damages exceeding this ceiling (such as catastrophic, large-scale harm), the victim may claim the excess through an independent action only upon proving fault or establishing direct causation attributable to a specific human agent.

The existence of a maximum ceiling serves several important purposes: first, managing the fund's resources and preventing its premature insolvency in the face of massive claims; second, creating an incentive for users and manufacturers to obtain supplementary insurance and observe higher safety standards; and third, preserving proportionality between the extent of the damage and the economic capacity of the fund's contributors.

3. A final right of recourse: After compensating the victim, the fund retains a right of recourse against any human agent subsequently identified as being at fault (such as a negligent programmer, an offending user, or a manufacturer that failed to observe safety standards), and may claim back the amount paid (or a portion thereof) from that responsible party.

This feature rests on the rule of “the sanctity of a Muslim's property” and the rule that “the blood of a Muslim shall not go to waste,” and is significant from two perspectives: first, it prevents a lack of accountability and ensures that the actual perpetrator of the offense is ultimately held responsible; and second, it contributes to the fund's financial sustainability by recovering resources in cases where a culpable human agent is identified.

4.3. Comparative Analysis and Discussion

The proposed model for the AI crime compensation fund can be analyzed and evaluated from two perspectives: its “conformity with Imamiyya jurisprudence” and a “comparison with analogous systems in comparative law.”

Conformity with Imamiyya Jurisprudence:

From a jurisprudential standpoint, the proposed fund rests on solid and firm foundations. The rule of *tasbib* clearly recognizes indirect liability and the creation of grounds for harm, treating it as giving rise to liability. The rule of *la darar* requires that no harm remain uncompensated, and this ruling is a foundational principle within the Islamic legal system. The rule of *ghurur* likewise subjects to liability those commercial companies marketing intelligent products that, through their advertising, create false confidence among users.

Moreover, within Shi'a governmental and social jurisprudence, the institution of *bayt al-mal* bears responsibility for compensating damages that have no identifiable private perpetrator (Mousavi Bojnourdi, 2019, p. 218). The proposed fund is, in effect, the development and evolution of this traditional institution in the age of emerging technologies. Some contemporary scholars likewise hold that Shi'a jurisprudence possesses the capacity to offer responses suited to contemporary technological challenges, including artificial intelligence, and that traditional rules such as *la darar*, *tasbib*, and *ghurur* can, through appropriate interpretation and extension, serve as the basis for modern compensation systems.

Comparison with Analogous Systems in Comparative Law:

A comparative study shows that advanced legal systems worldwide have likewise moved toward establishing no-fault compensation funds. Among the most important such examples are the following:

The no-fault compensation system for motor-vehicle accidents in the Scandinavian countries (Sweden, Finland, Norway, and Denmark), which has been in operation since the 1970s and has proven a successful experience. Under these systems, victims of traffic accidents receive compensation from a public or private fund without needing to prove fault or causation. Reports indicate that administrative and judicial costs in these countries have decreased considerably, while victim satisfaction has increased.

Compensation funds for damages caused by pharmaceutical products and vaccines exist in various countries, including Germany (Pharmaceutical Injured Persons Aid), France (Office National d'Indemnisation des Accidents Médicaux), and the United States (Vaccine Injury Compensation Program). Under these systems, individuals who suffer side effects from mandatory vaccines or certain medications receive compensation from a government fund without having to prove fault on the part of pharmaceutical companies. The German judicial system in this context is expressly grounded in “strict liability” (*Gefährdungshaftung*).

The nuclear-accident compensation regime, established under the Paris Convention (1960) and the Vienna Convention (1963), recognizes the absolute liability of nuclear-facility operators and provides for international compensation funds for potential accidents.

The principal difference between the proposed model and these foreign examples lies in the source of legitimacy and the underlying theoretical foundations. Whereas European and American funds are grounded in secular thought, social-welfare considerations, welfare economics, and at times purely political and public considerations, the Islamic model is directly tied to jurisprudential texts and rules. In other words, the legitimacy of the jurisprudential model derives from within the Islamic legal-ethical system, on the basis of valid Sharia proofs (the Qur'an, the traditions, consensus, and reason), whereas the legitimacy of Western funds arises predominantly from democratic processes and positive legislation.

Nevertheless, in terms of institutional structure and operational design, there is considerable similarity between the proposed model and these systems — particularly the German no-fault compensation regime for medical and pharmaceutical incidents, and the vaccine compensation fund in the United States, both of

which closely resemble our proposed structure. This similarity suggests that practical human reason, notwithstanding differences in theoretical foundations, arrives at similar solutions to shared problems — such as the efficient compensation of damages caused by emerging technologies (Shafaei, 2022, p. 112).

Limitations of the Research:

The most significant limitation of this research is the absence of any direct and explicit jurisprudential precedent addressing the subject of “artificial intelligence” as such, which necessarily compels the researcher to rely on the methods of jurisprudential analogy (qiyas) and inference through identification of the underlying rationale (tanqih al-manat). Although this method of inference is a valid and accepted method within the science of usul al-fiqh (particularly within Imamiyya jurisprudence, given its emphasis on reason as one of the four sources), it may not be accepted by all jurists and jurisprudential schools. Akhbari jurists, as well as some Sunni jurists, differ from Usuli and Shi'a jurists regarding the permissible scope of analogy in newly arising matters.

Moreover, this brief study cannot address all of the operational and implementation details of the fund, such as: the method for pricing and capping diyah and damages for cyber offenses and intangible harms (such as digital identity, data, and privacy); the process of establishing “causation” between the operation of an AI system and the resulting harm (which is exceedingly difficult in systems based on deep learning and neural networks); and mechanisms for preventing moral hazard on the part of users or manufacturers seeking to abuse the fund.

5. Conclusion and Recommendations

The principal aim of this research was to offer an operational, well-considered model, grounded in jurisprudential standards, for compensating damages arising from AI-related offenses within the framework of Imamiyya jurisprudence. The findings show that it is not, in fact, far-fetched to expect the jurisprudential system to offer a coherent and well-defined response to this newly arising problem. Solid, foundational rules such as la darar, tasbib, ghurur, and al-ghurm bil ghum can adequately justify and provide Sharia and legal support for the structure of a three-level fund (comprising organs and participants, diverse financial resources, and a hybrid compensation mechanism).

This model stands apart from the two extreme positions found in the existing literature. The first position, based on the complete negation of liability, denies any liability whatsoever on the sole ground of the absence of “intent” and “will” in artificial intelligence, leaving the victim without compensation. The second position, based on the pure imposition of liability on human beings, relies solely on the rule of tasbib without regard to the degree of autonomy and unpredictability of complex systems' behavior, and reaches a jurisprudential impasse in cases of full AI autonomy.

A middle path — one that is just and, at the same time, grounded in the objective realities of contemporary technology — can serve as a reference model for drafting national and transnational laws and regulations.

5.1. Practical and Legislative Recommendations for Policymakers and Legislators

1. Legislative domain (the legislature): There is an urgent need for the Islamic Consultative Assembly (Majlis) to enact a “Comprehensive Law on Civil and Criminal Liability for Artificial Intelligence” that explicitly provides for the “establishment of a national AI compensation fund” with the three-level structure proposed in this research, and for the determination, by the Supreme Judicial Council and the Supreme

Council of Cyberspace, of the Sharia and legal treatment of “diyah for cyber offenses and digital damages,” commensurate with the extent of harm caused to natural and legal persons.

2. Executive and regulatory domain (the executive branch and regulatory bodies): Large technology companies (whether domestic or foreign, operating in Iran) should be legally and religiously obligated to make an annual “liability contribution” payment to the fund, similar to value-added tax regulations, and clear, precise guidelines should be developed for assessing the degree of “autonomy” and “risk” of AI systems in order to set insurance-premium rates.

5.2. Recommendations for Future Research and Scholarship

1. Jurisprudence and legal theory (usul al-fiqh): A precise jurisprudential and theoretical feasibility study of mandatory third-party liability insurance to be obtained by AI manufacturers and users, and its precise conformity with Islamic contracts, particularly the contract of takaful, and its differences from conventional commercial insurance.

2. Criminal law and criminology: The development of objective, technical, and legal criteria for distinguishing between “mere autonomy” and “complete agency” in advanced AI systems — a distinction that determines whether the causal chain is broken and human liability thereby extinguished.

3. Comparative and international law: An in-depth, comprehensive comparative study of the structure, financial resources, and performance of AI- and related-technology compensation funds under transnational instruments (such as those of the European Union and the Council of Europe) and under the jurisprudence of the four Sunni schools, in comparison with Imamiyya jurisprudence.

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7. Conflict of Interest

The author declares that there is no financial, personal, professional, or political conflict of interest in connection with the content of this article, and that the results and findings of the present research are objective, independent, and free from the influence of any natural or legal entity outside academic and scholarly frameworks.

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