Multi-homing Limitations in the Brazilian Food Delivery Sector: A Case Study on iFood Cade’s Decision

Authors

  • Isabella Triebess Author

Keywords:

exclusivity clauses, antitrust, food delivery, iFood, multi-homing, CADE, digital platforms, dynamic competition, visibility, economic efficiencies

Abstract

 

The expansion of digital platforms influences competition policies, particularly in markets as online food delivery. This article examines the competition law’s treatment of exclusivity and the role of multi-homing in the sector, focusing on the Brazilian Competition Authority’s (CADE’s) decision in the iFood case. Multi-homing may seem an essential tool to enhance competition in digital platform markets, but it also has limitations and might harm entry in the market. A rigid treatment of exclusivity clauses by competition authorities can achieve benefits through multi-homing that must be balance against negative consequences, such as higher costs and decrease in marketing and data support for restaurants, especially small ones. Therefore, the online food delivery market debate shows the need to balance multi-homing as a competitive goal with economic efficiencies.

 

References

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Published

2024-02-20